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abStraCt
This paper challenges mainstream, neoliberal conceptualizations of the «Smart 
City» and the Incubator Hypothesis, by inserting grassroots creativity and 
solidarity into their logic. It is argued that the debt crisis in Southern Europe 
paves the way for a grassroots version of the Smart City, a city with hybrid public 
and common spaces, where the virtual and the material mingle, where grassroots 
creativity combines technology and knowledge, as it is largely based on massive 
ICT use and a highly educated young population. Typologies are constructed for 
several types of diverse collectivities, economies and productive initiatives. Top-
down strategies of quasi-Orientalist stigmatization and suppression of every mo-
bilization, alternative political discourse, imagination and creativity are sharply 
criticized as responsible for the crisis itself. Policy-oriented questions are posed 
and advocacy planning is explored in order to empower grassroots creativity in the 
context of digital societies.
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Ιf we learned political leadership 
and coalition building from the Russian 
Revolution, and popular initiative 
from the French Revolution, the Arab 
Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt 
demonstrated the power of networks.
(Allagui and Kuebler 2011, 
p. 1435, quoted by Castells 2012, p. 56) 
initiaL refLeCtionS and reSearCh QueStionS
The Mediterranean city has returned to the forefront of interest with massive 
upheavals during the 2010s. Solidarities emerge at the grassroots level, and 
simultaneous mobilizations across countries tend to become the rule. The 
massive uprisings against autocracies in North Africa during the ‘Arab 
Spring’ in 2010-2011 created a domino effect comparable with that on the 
European Mediterranean shores, where anti-austerity mobilizations of the 
Indignados shook the cities of Spain and then Greece in 2011. Mobilizations 
for local issues rapidly became trans-local emancipatory movements. 
Dissimilar as they are, Mediterranean mobilizations of the 2010s have three 
basic poles of resemblance: they all oppose facets of autocracy, even if 
some appear as posing only economic demands at first sight; they are all 
urban; and they all spread by digital means and social media. 
The «Arab Spring» has challenged autocracy directly at the political 
level, while Southern European populations have been facing the autoc-
racy of ‘the markets’ during the financial and debt crisis in the Eurozone, 
which has quickly become a social, cultural and political crisis, a crisis 
of eu hegemony and a divisive crisis. We have reached the point of the 
reconstruction of a North/ South divide within eu limits, within the Eu-
rozone, or rather a cοre/ periphery divide, extended up to Ireland on the 
Northwest (Afouxenidis, 2012; Leontidou, 2012b, 2015). This periphery 
was disrespectfully named piiGS (Portugal-Ireland-Italy-Greece-Spain). 
Dominant classes of the North and the eu core, especially Germany, direct 
their crypto-colonial discourses (Herzfeld, 2002) against the South. They 
not only dictate ways of conduct and development in rigid neoliberal rules 
to countries seized by the debt crisis; they also stigmatize the whole Eu-
ropean periphery in a quasi-Orientalist discourse1 as a ‘burden’ of laziness 
1. A version of the concept by Said (1978) can be used for stereotypes and disrespectful 
discourses on the eu South in our days (Leontidou, 2014, 2015).
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and corruption. Greece suffers from the worst stigmatization, to the point 
of malicious and ironic comments on the dress codes of its Prime Minis-
ter and MPs, throughout 2015. These discourses bring interwar memories, 
when the Mezzogiorno was accused as a ‘ball and chain’ for the North 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 71) and when fascism was rising in Europe and whole 
ethnic groups were stigmatized.
Gramsci’s constructivism is very fruitful for the study of the South at 
present (Leontidou, 2012b, 2015). The eu periphery is burdened with re-
sponsibilities for the collapse of the euro, is accused of causing the Euro-
zone crisis, at the same time as it is haunted by austerity and accumulation 
by dispossession by the banks of the North and ‘the markets’ more gener-
ally. Credit rating agencies like Moody’s, Fitch, Standard and Poor’s have 
made the downgrading of whole countries a self-fulfilling prophesy. The 
North/ South divide, which eu unification processes had the ambition of 
closing, becomes deeper with time, even at the political level, as first evi-
dent in the eu parliamentary election results of May 2014, with the rise of 
Northern Eurosceptics and the extreme Right contrasting with the rise of 
the democratic Left in the South, which finally came to power in Greece 
(Syriza, January 2015 elections) and rose in Spain (Podemos). before the 
Greek elections, when this paper was conceived, many of the author’s re-
flections seemed futile in the midst of autocracy and rigid neoliberal aus-
terity policies. Since 2015, however, the paper benefits from hindsight and 
there is hope flickering, that our reflections on urban policy may be realis-
tic, irrespective of austerity memoranda and in spite of them.
Urbanism forms the core of the 2010s mobilizations in Southern Eu-
rope, as stressed by many scholars. For some, the crisis affects primar-
ily urban areas (Castells, 2012) and stimulates demands for the ‘right to 
the city’ (Lebfebvre, 1968; Leontidou, 2010; Brenner et al., 2012; Harvey, 
2012). For others, it has originated in urbanization and the real estate sec-
tor (Harvey 2012), which is so for the uSa, but not universal for the Medi-
terranean. Whatever the underlying dynamics, the explanations and the 
discourse, massive popular presence in city streets and piazzas have un-
derlined the pivotal role of urbanism in the crisis. The core significance of 
the urban dimension in Mediterranean anti-austerity movements certainly 
turns our attention to cities, which are the focus of this paper.
Another pole of utmost importance, which will be explored here, is 
the wide dissemination of Information and Communication Technologies 
(henceforth iCt). In fact, it has been established that the domino effect of 
Mediterranean movements has been basically facilitated by digital com-
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munication. Despite the fact that iCt is not as widely used in the South 
as in the North,2 we will argue that it transforms urban public spaces into 
hybrid areas and spaces of flows, opening up new prospects for the com-
munication and solidarity among broad social strata. Urban populations 
communicate by internet and mobile phone networks and increasingly 
engage in social networking. iCt do not ‘determine’ social behavior, but 
then again they “are not simply tools, but organizational forms, cultural 
expressions and specific platforms for political autonomy” (Castells, 2012, 
p. 103). They create new fusions and spatialities, which have a profound 
impact on urban life patterns and development.
In this paper we will explore prospects, rather than engaging again 
with the overexposed dystopia of the crisis. There is already a lot of ma-
terial on the destruction of urban enterprises and livelihoods during the 
2010s. We will demonstrate, however, that as the crisis falls on digital 
cities, it also stimulates creative niches at the grassroots level. Technologi-
cal dissemination, digital penetration and interactive social media have 
not only facilitated resistance to political and economic autocracies, but 
have also supported new cultural forms of grassroots creativity. We will 
argue that this paves the way for a Mediterranean version of the Smart 
City, based on knowledge and new technology used in alternative niches 
of subsistence and solidarity economies, new productive initiatives and 
creative ventures.
There is an ongoing critique against mainstream conceptualizations of 
the Smart City, which are based on new regionalism theories, technologi-
cal determinism and the neoliberal logic (Kourliouros and Panagopoulos, 
2013). At the moment of the crisis, an alternative is not only worth explor-
ing systematically, but also worth pursuing in advocacy planning, because 
of the opportunities offered for a way out of the crisis and into the devel-
opment of a new and better society, where social exclusion, unemploy-
ment and the brain drain may be minimized. Our conceptual apparatus 
emerges from Mediterranean Europe and evidence is derived especially 
from participant observation3 and the Internet. Typologies are constructed 
2. Though there is some fetishization of iCt in some cases, researchers are also aware 
that in certain countries or regions of the eu people are not well connected, and the South is 
especially disadvantaged in this respect (eSpon SieSta 2013). Increasingly, however, mobile 
phones, i-pads and tablets draw large crowds into cyberspaces.
3. The author has been a marginal participant/ observer in the ‘movement of the piazzas’ in 
2011, the ert mobilizations in 2013, the CommonsFest in 2015, and other mobilizations and 
events in athens.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 23:56:04 |
 «Smart CitieS» of the debt CriSiS 73
for a multitude of development strategies emerging during the crisis based 
on findings from Greece, which is constantly on the international spotlight.
diGitaL SpatiaLitieS and hybrid urban piaZZaS
It used to be sufficient in the 20th century to place urban social movements 
in material spaces of the city, until the digital city emerged in the virtual 
space of iCt, social media and e-networking (Craglia et al., 2004). The 
rapid transformation of digital societies has been a wonder for older 
generations, who were living adult lives without even a computer, not to 
mention a mobile phone or a laptop or tablet, until the mid-1990s. Wireless 
technology and digital communication have become interactive and 
penetrate every household in the wake of the most democratic industrial 
revolution ever, where technology is in everyone’s hands.
This has resulted in an evolving continuum of interaction between vir-
tual and material spaces (Meek, 2012), which has extended from the space 
of places to the space of flows (Castells, 2012, p. 61) and has merged into 
hybrid spaces and spatialities. The debt crisis in Europe in the 2010s took 
place in such a hybrid realm. Massive uprisings by the Southern grassroots 
against the austerity measures and the democratic deficit in the eu were 
largely facilitated by iCt innovations. Activists, but also more broadly 
educated young people, especially those hit by unemployment, have been 
mobilizing online and assembling offline (Harlow, 2011) and online, too, 
via Skype and social media (Leontidou, 2012a). Counter-hegemonic uses 
of the Internet spread. This growing importance of iCt, digital penetration, 
wireless communication, social media and interactive technologies in eco-
nomic, political and socio-cultural development is increasingly reflected in 
current research on their societal role.
The wide and massive dissemination of the digital ‘revolution’ started 
with cell phones and laptops, continued with i-phones and tablets, and has 
been revitalized with social media and Web 2.0 applications,4 opening the 
way for digital interaction among individuals, collectivities and cities (Cra-
glia et al., 2004; Meek, 2012; Gonzalez and Carril, 2013). iCt and social 
network sites are integrated into everyday life and practice for millions of 
people and organizations around the globe. New research on their impact 
on constitutional democracy and political participation already shows that 
they transform the rules and methods of political engagement (Afouxenidis, 
4. Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, YouTube, MySpace, etc.
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2014). Whether a promise for a more democratic future (Castells, 2012), 
or a process which acts towards the concentration of power into the hands 
of the few (Hindman 2008), digital communication is indeed Janus-faced, 
but it can no longer be ignored (Afouxenidis, 2014).
The grassroots was inserted into the discussion on digital societies and 
vice versa at the heyday of the transnational alter-globalization movements 
during the late 20th century,5 as the Internet was turning to a counter-he-
gemonic tool of communication among broad collectivities and people, 
who assembled to protest in many parts of the globe. There was a setback 
caused by September 11 2001 and also by the death of the activist Carlo 
Giuliani in Genoa the same year. After 2006, however, the excitement was 
revived, with alter-globalization demonstrations and other sorts of upris-
ings (Della Porta et al., 2009). Those in the Paris banlieu, which originated 
locally but spread from Paris to all French towns by online activism, oc-
cupied centre stage in 2006 and stirred interest and solidarity at the global 
level (Leontidou, 2006, 2010; Routledge, 2010).
Interactive technologies then exploded to change ways of mobiliza-
tion and commitment. This trend became massive in the 2010s around the 
Mediterranean area and in the Occupy movements in the Anglo-American 
world (Badiou, 2012; Castells, 2012; Harvey, 2012; Leontidou, 2012a). 
The sudden realization of the strengths of digital networking came with the 
‘Arab Spring’. The domino effect of the Sidi Bouzid uprising in Decem-
ber 2010 toward small towns and then the capital of Tunisia also ignited 
social movements up to Egypt, especially Cairo and its reknown Tahrir 
Square (Dabashi, 2012; Filiu, 2011). The mobilized grassroots had entered 
massively into the scene of digital communication, forming ‘networks of 
outrage and hope’ which helped overcome fear (Castells, 2012, pp. 80-81). 
The connection between free communication on Facebook, You Tube 
and Twitter and the occupation of urban space created a hybrid public 
space of freedom that became a major feature of the Tunisian rebellion, 
foreshadowing the movements to come in other countries. Convoys of 
solidarity were formed by hundreds of cars converging in the capital. On 
January 22, 2011, the Convoy of Liberty …, beginning in Sidi Bouzid and 
Menzel Bouzaiane, reached the Kasbah in the Tunis Medina… (Castells 
2012, p. 23).
5. Among the several analyses of that important period, see Smith et al., 1997; Hamel et al., 
2000; Tilly, 2004; Della Porta, et al., 2006, 2009; Leontidou, 2010; Castells, 2012.
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The North African mobilizations were followed by the ‘Movement 
of the Piazzas’ in the northern Mediterranean shores. The domino effect 
reached from Spain to Greece from mid-May 2011.6 Two years later, mo-
bilizations were ignited against the building-up of Gezi park in Istanbul, 
which shook many cities of Turkey from late May 2013 (Eraydin et al., 
2014; Oktem Unsal, 2015), and, after a week, protest against censorship 
in Greece after the silencing of the Hellenic tv, ert, in Athens, spread 
to become an international issue (Leontidou, 2014). In all these move-
ments the Internet, and especially Web 2.0 applications, grew to be a ma-
jor counter-hegemonic tool, but also a means of communication widening 
spatial boundaries and ‘commoning’ the public realm. Cosmopolitan soli-
darities were forged. Society, cultures, and technology itself were trans-
formed with online activism but also with the interaction between comput-
ers, smart phones, and “other traditional communication channels like fax 
machines, ham radio and dial-up modems [which] helped to overcome the 
blocking of the Internet” (Castells, 2012, p. 63). In Egypt, SmSs would be 
retrieved by phone and converted to fax messages for wider dissemination 
(Castells, 2012, p. 64). In Europe, Spanish and Greek popular assemblies 
communicated by Skype (Leontidou, 2012a).
Hybrid spatialities, online and offline at the same time, have been of-
fering a sense of belonging, which disperses initial fears of assembling.7 
Occupations, social centres and squats in abandoned buildings or unused 
spaces as hubs of alternative cultures continue from the past, but come 
to radiate to global communities and interact through iCt. Digital com-
munication has sustained or even sparked mobilizations and solidarities 
over long distances and has facilitated the crystallization of new forms 
of transnational collectivities and cosmopolitan civil societies (Leontidou, 
2010, 2015; Kousis, 2014). Research is emerging which systematizes the 
massive use of new communication technology at the grassroots level, in 
order to renew collective action theory and put iCt studies centre stage.
6. the Indignados movement was also called ‘15 Mayo’ in Spain and named the Greek 
one as Aganaktismeni. Among the voluminous bibliography, see Giovanopoulos et al., 2011; 
Castells, 2012; Leontidou, 2012a, 2014; Douzinas, 2013; Kousis, 2014, and many others.
7. Castells (2012, pp. 80-81) attributes the overcoming of fear to being together in the 
squares and also in the Internet, with positive emotions of outrage and hope. During the ‘Arab 
spring’, even phobias of surveillance subsided (Dabashi, 2012; Filiu, 2011), when Mubarak’s 
decision to cut off people from the Internet in Egypt intensified the already massive mobiliza-
tion in Tahrir Square in 2011, instead of curtailing it. In Turkey, Erdogan did not manage to 
enforce his decision to cut first Tweeter, then YouTube, after mobilizations in Taksim Square.
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Urban theory has to be renewed, too. Cities are transformed with the 
widespread use of ICT (Craglia et al., 2004). In fact, the ontology8 has 
shifted, in that e-networking is now taken for granted. The urban public 
realm of the new millennium clearly differs from that of the past. Publics, 
as we know them today, emerged with the invention of the printing press 
in the 16th century. The ‘public’ then existed as a ‘purely spiritual collectiv-
ity, as a dissemination of physically separated individuals whose cohesion 
is entirely mental’ (Tarde 1898 cited in Laclau, 2005, pp. 44-5). Physical 
presence was not a precondition for a public realm, as it is not today, either. 
Now, with digital interaction rising next to printed sources, the cell phone, 
the Internet, Web 2.0 applications and social media bridge the private and 
the public and turn ‘mental cohesion’ into communicative action and inter-
action rather than one-way communication. This very important passage 
from hierarchies to networks results in democratization, hybridity, and the 
emergence of ‘the commons’ next to the public realm.
The shrinkage of the centralized and hierarchical public realm of the 
20th century, especially during the debt crisis, reveals a new shared space, 
managed by the grassroots rather than the state, and hence, ‘common’ rath-
er than public (De Angelis, 2010). It also brings to light new configura-
tions in the context of the virtualization and decentralization of actions and 
struggles (Amin, 2009). New hybrid spaces are highlighted by the fusion 
of the material and the virtual within them (Leontidou, 2012a): spaces of 
flows, where the online and the offline merge into hybrid configurations. 
The public becomes common and acquires tangible cohesion, instant com-
munication capacity, vitality and indeed reality as a hybrid realm. Common 
urban spaces are local and global, material and virtual at the same time, 
where politics, society, economy are discussed – on the web or in person 
– and alternative strategies or innovations crystallize. These are also trans-
local spaces, because digital speed combats the friction of distance.
The material and the virtual eventually merge in the Mediterranean city 
in ways different from the North. Southern urban development has been 
spontaneous for a very long period of informality and self-organization 
(Leontidou, 1990). Throughout the 20th century, Mediterranean move-
ments for the ‘right to the city’ mostly involved spontaneous urbaniza-
tion: squatter settlements on peripheral land and popular illegal suburbs 
(Leontidou, 1990, 2010). These have been often as massive as in Latin 
America, where squatting now coincides with social movements acting as 
8. Ontology as a theory of being – social, cultural, political.
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‘critical urban planning’ agents (Souza, 2006). Grassroots movements and 
creative initiatives to reconquer urban space, public land, parks and piaz-
zas threatened by redevelopment are still stirring in the global South, but 
squatting on the urban periphery as a grassroots activity is almost extinct 
in South European cities since the late 20th century, due to government 
coercion and ‘legalizations’ (Leontidou, 1990). Popular spontaneity has 
been transferred from the realm of struggles for shelter to anti-austerity 
mobilization (Leontidou, 2012a, 2014, 2015). New Mediterranean ‘leader-
less movements’ have brought spontaneity closer to Gramsci’s definition. 
The idiosyncrasy of these movements is not that they lack organization, as 
critics of the concept of spontaneity claim. Spontaneity is rather defined 
as lack of hierarchies and an antithesis to conscious leadership (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 196), not lack of organization (Leontidou, 2012a).
Mediterranean public spaces have never been regulated by zoning 
through the action of planners and the state, as their Northern counterparts. 
Southern cities have been always mixed, because of spontaneous activ-
ity and flexible work arrangements in the informal economy and housing 
(Leontidou, 1990; Gialis and Leontidou, 2014). Now this mixed land use 
is enhanced with hybridity, reproduced with the flowing fusion of material 
and virtual public spaces. Mobilizations extend from the online collection 
of signatures or calls for demonstrations, to offline active politics on the 
streets and piazzas. Virtual communication will always finally extend to-
wards the physical, since material presence forges trust among activists in 
risky collective actions (Filiu, 2011; Castells, 2012). Besides the juxtapo-
sition of purely material urban piazzas and purely virtual shared spaces of 
the Internet for communication and online mobilization, there are fusions 
emerging in internet cafés and wi-fi stations, in kiosks and tents during mo-
bilizations, in Skype screens of teleconferencing and telecommunication 
among piazzas. These reproduce hybridity by extending their materiality 
towards further geographical boundaries, virtually.
In other words, digital spatialities obliterate the material/ virtual dual-
ism and give the preponderance to in-between spaces: the two poles inter-
act, giving birth to a third space of flows, a fusion of the material and the 
virtual, in fact a hybrid space. Individuals and/or groups engaged in digital 
activism do not remain online: they take to the streets and piazzas; and 
movements generated entirely online may then be moving offline (Bakard-
jieva et al., 2012; Harlow, 2011). In fact, while the distinction offline/online 
may have some methodological validity, the two ‘realities’ tend to merge 
and should be examined in conjunction rather than in opposition (Harlow, 
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2011; Meek, 2012; Afouxenidis, 2014). People reclaiming the streets and 
piazzas carry their digital devices there and remain constantly online, sus-
taining the fusion of the virtual and the material in public spaces. Inversely, 
the capacity of cell phones and e-networking for instantaneous mobiliza-
tion of people to materially gather in streets and piazzas creates uprisings 
in the most unlikely places. These spontaneous relatively impromptu so-
cial gatherings in urban spaces, which are organized using social media, 
have a name since the 1990s: flash mobs (Meek, 2012, p. 1432).The hybrid 
public spaces emerging from this fusion constitute a previously inexistent 
public realm of trans-locality, where the interaction and constant interplay 
between material and virtual networks broadens the hybrid public spaces 
of communication, interaction and solidarity far beyond the local, flowing 
from the space of places towards the global.
The piazzas of Mediterranean European cities have seen many such 
trans-local spatialities in mobilizations during the 2010s. The occupations 
of Syntagma in Athens and Puerta del Sol in Madrid, following the ‘Arab 
Spring’ and coinciding with the Occupy movements in the Anglo-American 
world, were embedded in a continuum between virtual and material spaces. 
All these movements assembled with the exchange of messages in social 
media, had their iCt headquarters in tents, and were in constant interaction 
with remote spaces abroad (Leontidou, 2012a; Kousis, 2014). In Southern 
Europe, a screen was the material and virtual linkage between Syntagma, 
Athens, and Puerta del Sol, Madrid, in June 2011, where popular assemblies 
convened together by Skype, discussed several alternative strategies and 
practiced direct democracy, as in the ancient Greek agora, and more demo-
cratically, too, with the active participation of women (Leontidou, 2012a).
Digitalization was perhaps at its most vibrant during the summer of 
2013 in Athens, when the Greek conservative government suddenly closed 
down ert, the Hellenic tv, in a move of unprecedented censorship in 
modern Europe. All broadcasts of ert stopped and tv screens went black 
in 11 June 2013 throughout Greece and abroad, too, radio stations were 
silenced, and journalists were sacked. However, the dismissed journalists 
did not abandon the premises and kept broadcasting through websites sup-
porting their cause.9 Crowds of protesters in the ert courtyard came to 
watch the ert web broadcasts on the large screen and attend concerts, 
9. Like the international one of the European Broadcasting Union (ebu), at http://www3.
ebu.ch/cms/en/sites/ebu/contents/news/2013/06/monitor-ert-online.html (last accessed in Au-
gust 2013).
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discussions and other events of solidarity by the international community. 
the ert mobilizations signaled the most direct coexistence of the mate-
rial and the virtual in the common space of the ert courtyard, radiating 
to the broader cityscape and to the world by Internet. This had important 
wider repercussions, especially the sudden growth of digital literacy (Leo-
ntidou, 2014), because of the thrust of increasing numbers of people for 
Internet access to watch ert online. Viewer numbers shot to high levels 
in Greece after the ert tv ‘black screen’, when the older generation, too, 
went online to watch the forbidden channels. The operation went on after 
the events, with cooperative media: ert Open kept broadcasting on the 
internet10 in the space of the ‘commons’.
Expressions of solidarity to Southern anti-austerity mobilizations from 
activists, intellectuals and artists abroad dissolve isolation and fear of the 
dystopias propagated by ruling elites of the eu, bankers and bureaucrats, 
and empower grassroots collectivities to resist neoliberal hegemony in 
Southern Europe. This undercurrent of empowering initiatives would be 
difficult to emerge without iCt. Interactive technology also offers opportu-
nities for the survival of niches creativity at the aftermath of massive mobi-
lizations. However, these alternative initiatives remain vulnerable, because 
they have not been valorized or protected. The constant interplay between 
creativity and repression, among theoretical dualisms, contrasts, utopias, 
and cross-fertilizations in contemporary Mediterranean cities is summed 
up in Table1. The top lines include some antithetical or even clashing op-
posites in constant tension and contradiction; the middle (shaded) lines 
include apparent antitheses which, however, can be deconstructed; and the 
bottom lines include bipolarities and couplets in juxtaposition, interaction 
and cross-fertilization.
Vulnerability and empowerment, destruction and creation, austerity of 
the crisis and initiatives against it, interplay in a Janus-faced reality and 
can be deconstructed: destroy in order to create, or ‘creative destruction’, 
as Schumpeter (1939) suggested in a different context (Kourliouros, 2011, 
pp. 21, 148, 275-6). Grassroots creativity emerging from contentious poli-
tics can be conducive to social cohesion. Solidarity and interaction during 
upheavals melts antitheses and fosters harmony.
10. Broadcasts continued at www.ertopen.com (last accessed in May 2014), even after the 
establishment of nerit by the conservative government on 4.5.2015 at 6 pm. This lasted for two 
years. On 11 June 2015, under the Syriza government, ert reopened on the exact two-year an-
niversary of the ‘black screen’. Journalists, musicians, reporters were re-established in their jobs.
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tabLe 1







Neoliberal hegemony and top-
down policy – autocracies distinguished from
Grassroots solidarity and survival 
strategies – direct democracy
Organization, planning, zoning 
in the city distinguished from
Spontaneity, informality, porosity, 
mixed land use in the city
dystopia distinguished from eutopia
Destruction, violence, urbicide is the other face of Grassroots creativity (creative destruction)
Web concentrating power in the 
hands of the few and internet as 
a tool against privacy and sur-
veillance system 
is the other face of
Web as a promise for a more 
democratic future and Internet 
as a counter-hegemonic tool of 
instantaneous communication and 
international solidarity
Vulnerability is the other face of Empowerment
The public mingles with The ‘commons’
Material public spaces, the piaz-
zas, internet cafés, free wi-fi 
bars
Interplay or mingle with
Virtual public spaces through 
broadband e-networking, wi-fi 
stations
Offline mingles with Online
Material grassroots alternative 
initiatives mingle with
Digital grassroots alternative 
initiatives
Spatial differentiation or het-
erogeneity, diversity, difference 
among cities
interacts with 
Spatial harmonization of initia-
tives, interaction across space via 
ICT and social networks, and 
hence, coordination and homo-
geneity
mediterranean City theory cross-fertilized with Smart City theory
Structure interacts with Agency
 Source: Constructed by the author.
From a theoretical standpoint, the above discussion takes one step fur-
ther the standard dilemma of Geography between spatial differentiation 
vs. homogeneity. Urban diversity, i.e. different forms and intensities of 
creativity by a multitude of actors and collectivities, coexists with the har-
monization of alternative initiatives across space via iCt. in Southern eu-
ropean and other Mediterranean cities, harmonization follows communica-
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tion through social networks, wherein collectivities now interconnected by 
e-networking in different cities and parts of the world take advantage of 
digital technology to expand their public realm, to open up the ‘commons’, 
to cross-fertilize their ideas, and coordinate their alternative strategies in 
communication and harmony with similar collectivities at a long distance. 
Grassroots creativity builds up towards the crystallization of alternative 
urbanism. Digital societies facilitate the encounter between diverse cities 
through ICT and thus tend to harmonize spatially differentiated uprisings, 
social mobilizations, and their aftermath.
Smart CitieS vs the urban meLtdoWn
Let us now formalize the above discussion in the context of urban theory. 
ICT penetration in Mediterranean public spaces in combination with the 
debt crisis throws new light to the contradiction between urban blight and 
regeneration. We explore the latter here by recalling the concept of Smart 
City, which becomes, unexpectedly, an offspring of the crisis in the eu 
South and will be analyzed in this paper as a means to counteract the crisis. 
But let us first understand the impact of the crisis on the city. The urban 
meltdown is a combination of urban decline and urbicide, the destruction 
of the city during clashes between the police and activists. The meltdown is 
remarkable and, among Greek cities of impoverishment and blight, Athens 
has been in the global spotlight for several years, with striking spectacles 
of urbicide during upheavals, especially since December 2008. Riots broke 
out when the police killed a 15-year-old schoolboy, Alexis Grigoropoulos 
(Vradis and Dalakoglou, 2011; Giovanopoulos and Mitropoulos, 2011; 
Douzinas, 2013). The city was then in flames in 2008 with recurrent 
urbicide again later, especially in 2011 and 2013.
As for urban decline, Athens is sometimes compared with Third World 
cities, but it does not even have their dynamism, as shown on Table 2.
TABLE 2
Counter-urbanization in Athens, 1981-2011
Urban sector 1981 1991 2001 2011 
Attica 3,369,425 3,523,408 3,761,810 3,812,330 
Greater athens 3,038,245 3,072,922 3,187,734 3,122,540 
Central Athens  885,737  772,072  745,514 655,780
Source: Adapted by the author from Statistical Service of Greece (ELSTAT) general census 
data.
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Greater athens entered the eu in 1981 with 3,038,245 inhabitants, a 
population slightly increasing until the wake of the new millennium, but 
shrinking below the level of natural increase according to provisional data 
of the 2011 census. Some urban sprawl to the periphery made the broader 
Attica region a more dynamic area, especially in the 1990s, held to the 
top by middle-class households leaving the inner city, as well as entrepre-
neurs with contracts for infrastructure provision and real estate developers 
(Couch et al., 2007). By contrast, a literal collapse has hit the inner city. 
Huge dimensions of depopulation are found by a glance at the last row 
of Table 2: the central Athens municipality entered the eu with 885.737 
people in 1981, but gradually and then suddenly – during the crisis – lost 
much of its population and remained with 655,780 inhabitants, according 
to the 2011 census.
The decline is the effect of several parallel processes: (a) the move of 
the bourgeoisie and middle classes to the suburbs (more pronounced in 
the late 20th century, Leontidou 2011a); (b) de-industrialization, or rather 
de-commercialization and the departure of small entrepreneurs who used 
to combine work and residence in the inner city; (c) the migration of the 
young, a brain drain (Lambrianides and Vogiatzis, 2013); (d) homelessness 
of the nouveau poor (Kaika, 2012), some of whom often used to be proper 
middle classes but have lost their jobs and their belongings and have been 
evicted from their homes, but also (e) the hidden population of migrants, 
who feared to face the interviewers during the 2011 census.11 Still, no mat-
ter how many clandestine migrants evaded the census, it is a fact that Ath-
ens not only is no longer the fast-growing city as it was in the twentieth 
century, but is undergoing a counter-urbanization phase unprecedented in 
mediterranean urban histories.
Almost all of the shrinkage of the Greek population these years origi-
nates in Athens. The whole urban economy has collapsed, with shop clo-
sures, bankruptcies, a depressed housing market, a shrinking estate sector, 
at the same time as there is over-taxation of property, as well as evictions, 
in order to satisfy Eurozone lenders. The urban meltdown is visible in the 
urban landscape, with closed-down shops on every street and corner out-
numbering the open ones, empty houses marked by a multitude of signs 
‘To Let’ or ‘For Sale’ on every street, and vandalized property. But the 
11. Migrants frightened from police ‘clearances’ (‘skoupa’ operations) in 2011 kept hiding 
from interviewers. Despite this major flaw of the census, however, the fact of a major population 
loss hitting the central Athens municipality remains.
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worst sight is the desperate faces of the homeless, the beggars, the vaga-
bonds every step of the way, roaming the city streets in the 2010s. A cultur-
al crisis is lurking, a crisis in civil society (Leontidou, 2015), with the rise 
of the extreme Right and urban criminality in certain nuclei of a city which 
used to be one of the safest ones in the world. Destitution is most evident 
around Omonia and Victoria Squares and in some parks, the largest of 
which is Pedion Areos, where recent migrants and refugees from the Mid-
dle East assemble. Urban blight haunts the whole eu South, as shown in 
economic indicators for Spain and Italy, too (Gialis and Leontidou, 2014), 
as well as Portugal (Gonzalez and Carril, 2013; ESPON-SIESTA, 2013), but 
Greece is worse off. The global financial crisis is transforming Mediter-
ranean eutopias of sunshine, culture and joie de vivre into bleak dystopias 
(Leontidou, 2014).
Top-down policy considers bringing urban regeneration by ‘shop front 
works’ (erga vitrinas), decorative interventions to boost land and property 
values and satisfy urban tourism, like the pedestrianization and the decora-
tion of central arteries (e.g. Panepistimiou St in Athens12), the renovation of 
certain areas, the gentrification of others to the benefit of entrepreneurs, as 
in Istanbul (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011; Eraydin and Tasan-Kok, 2014; 
Oktem Unsal, 2015), and major works along the seafront. Our reflection in 
this paper is that, besides its unjust effects in the social composition of the 
affected urban areas, this consumption-oriented approach is inappropriate 
for the South, which requires mainly the creation of value by productive 
activities to overcome the crisis.
Niches of grassroots creativity combined with wide iCt dissemination 
points to other, innovative, ways of counteracting the dystopia. We will 
support their importance by linking up with past concepts of Smart Cit-
ies, Creative cities, technopoles and cyberspaces.13 these were inspired 
by neoliberal assumptions, which only incorporated knowledge and tech-
12. For an extended critique, see the inspired satirical work by visual artists of Arbit City 
Group against the Panepistimiou project: http://arbitcitygroup.com/ (last accessed in May 
2015). See also Leontidou, 2011b.
13. Literature stressed Industrial Districts in the 1980s (technological parks etc., Kour-
liouros, 1998), Learning Regions in the 1990s (regional innovation systems etc, Storper 1992), 
Science Parks and technopoles all along (Kourliouros and Panagopoulos, 2013) – especially 
along corridors of ‘smart growth’ in the uK (Massey et al., 1992), or eu developmental cor-
ridors, consisting of high Gdp percentages and people employed in iCt by region (ESPON- 
SIESTA, 2013). In the case of cities, literature now leans less to Smart Cities and more to Crea-
tive Cities, which is a different concept (Florida, 2002; Pratt, 2011).
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nological sophistication at the elite level, before iCt use was popularized. 
Now digital technologies saturate the quotidian and the public realm, and 
they increasingly fall to the hands of digitally literate, highly educated 
(hence, intelligent), highly skilled young people and their creative collec-
tivities, belonging to the knowledge economy. These people often feed the 
Mediterranean ‘brain drain’, by migrating abroad and excelling in foreign 
lands.14 If they do not, they may roam in unemployment, which hits over-
whelming percentages of young people;15 they may engage in activism; 
and they may also become exactly the main ‘human capital’ for the con-
figuration of the Smart City.
Smart City is basically a nomothetic16 and proactive concept, which 
places technology and knowledge as the important factors against urban 
blight (Campbell, 2012). In mainstream bibliography, the concept has a 
strong technological component, including communication technologies, 
data management technologies and digital applications; it also has a hu-
man component with higher education and skills leading to innovation and 
knowledge-based regional development (Kourliouros and Panagopoulos, 
2013). If we employ it to cities of the current debt crisis, its emphasis 
on technology and knowledge can be retained. The hybrid urban public 
spaces of the Mediterranean during the crisis constitute the basic core of 
the Smart City, which is composed by innovative articulations of diverse 
components.
The concept of the Smart City in its present form appears largely in-
appropriate for Mediterranean cities and the crisis-hit Southern Europe, 
because it prioritizes competitiveness and economic growth rather than 
informality, ‘commoning’, spontaneity and development, and addresses 
dominant groups and power elites, neglecting the grassroots and relegating 
them to austerity, destroying their life prospects in the years of the debt cri-
sis. We propose here to revisit theories of the Smart City with the theoreti-
cal ambition of disembedding them from the neoliberal logic of capitalist 
accumulation, entrepreneurial city, urban competition and gentrification. 
14. The outflow of the last 20 years of globalization (Lambrianides, 2011, 2013) was exac-
erbated with the debt crisis (Lambrianides and Vogiatzis, 2013).
15. In Greece by November 2013 unemployment had hit a high of 28% of the labour force, 
and youth unemployment (15-24 years old) an abhorrent 61.4% (eLStat estimates in February 
2014; cf. Gialis and Leontidou, 2014).
16. In the sense used in Human Geography, nomothetic science seeks general laws, tends 
to projections, and constitutes the antithesis to ideographic notions of possibilist Geography 
(Leontidou, 2011a).
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Smart City theory does not have to espouse the neoliberal logic, in which it 
has been embedded for so long and in such an exclusive manner. With iCt 
dissemination, common spaces of broader solidarities are emerging. The 
massive entrance of the e-networked grassroots can release the concept of 
the Smart City from the neoliberal logic, while retaining many of its tech-
nological and human/ knowledge components.
Smart City theory has been constantly reformulated in the last decades, 
with layers added to its definition in different periods of time correspond-
ing to different theoretical approaches and policies.17 The concept must 
be distinguished from Florida’s (2002) Creative City, because the latter 
prioritizes culture and the affluent classes rather than technology, environ-
ment and the knowledge economy. Although knowledge interacts with all 
of these elements in both concepts, some are prioritized more strongly in 
each one of them. By going deeper into this transformation, we can actual-
ly deconstruct top-down policy as reflected in the multitude of documents 
produced,18 and come to explore innovative or radical grassroots actions 
and alternative initiatives outside the realm of conventional policies. This 
is a popular, grassroots, Smart City that we are seeking here.
The wide diffusion of wireless technology and e-networking lies at the 
core of mainstream theories of the Smart City, and it is one short step 
ahead, to link it up with the e-networked grassroots, which is quite dy-
namic, or even cosmopolitan. The theory can be re-invigorated if we rear-
range its components, keeping knowledge, innovation and the role of iCt 
at the core of the Smart City theory, but emphasizing the grassroots on the 
one hand, and trans-locality on the other, with a cross-fertilization with 
Mediterranean city theory.
Such a breakthrough is happening in the Creative City debate, with 
a critique of Florida (2002) and the departure from entrepreneurialism 
(Evans, 2009; Grodach, 2013; Peck, 2005; Pratt, 2011), and even a turn 
towards the grassroots with the adoption of the concept of the ‘creative 
underclass’ (Gornostaeva and Campbell, 2012; Morgan and Ren, 2012). 
17. In the new millennium, Digital Cities (Craglia et al., 2004), Intelligent Cities (Komni-
nos, 2008; Deakin et al., 2012), and more recently Regional Smart Specialization (EC S3 2013) 
and smart growth (ESPON-SIESTA, 2013) have been added.
18. At the turn of the 21st century, the eu saw the proliferation of several documents on 
‘Smart Growth’, the flagship initiatives ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’, ‘Innovation union’, 
‘Youth on the Move’, and ‘an Agenda for New Skills and Jobs’, which highlight basic dimen-
sions and relevant policy guidelines toward ‘Smart Growth’ (CEC, 2001, 2002; Gonzalez and 
Carril, 2013; ESPON-SIESTA, 2013).
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By contrast, the concept of the Smart City has not been problematized or 
deconstructed adequately, and the neoliberal logic is still taken for granted. 
Only recently have Schafferset et al. (2012) argued that the Smart City is 
composed by three components (socio-economic, knowledge/ institutional, 
and technological), but have also suggested another definition, considering 
how people are empowered, through using technology, for contributing to 
urban change and realizing their ambitions. This departs slightly from ear-
lier mainstream definitions of creativity and policy ‘from above’, wherein 
the grassroots is considered as rather passive and inert, and its alternative 
initiatives are ignored, to the expense of social cohesion, development and 
innovation. Further departures have recently appeared outside mainstream 
academic journals: Biduneau-Wang and Galharret (2011) incorporate al-
ternative currencies into the Smart City debate, and Ratti and Townsend 
(2011) argue that central planning fails in understanding peoples’ needs, 
because it ignores the creative potential of the grassroots and goals of so-
cial cohesion, quality of life and direct democracy.
The incorporation of the grassroots into the discussion of the Smart 
City is urgent in the case of the Mediterranean, not only because of its 
pivotal role in the present crisis, but also because popular strata have had 
a long historic role in urban restructuring in Southern Europe (Leontidou 
1990). In Greece, elites tended to live in secluded quarters or to reside 
abroad and be much less important for domestic urban and local issues 
than in the north.19 By contrast, workers, informal labourers and home 
workers have often figured as the most crucial social classes in Mediter-
ranean urban histories through their spontaneous action (Leontidou, 1990, 
2012a). In the crisis, this spontaneous action involves digital creativity 
enclaves. These constitute the third alternative, between the dark prospect 
of unemployment/ homelessness/ nouveau poor/ destitution on the one 
hand, and displacement on the other: the brain drain, which emerges with 
the young skilled population as its core (Lambrianides, 2013). It is worth 
exploring ways to enhance this trend and strategies of reversal of the urban 
meltdown. As the previously unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism is 
contested during the crisis, we can venture to emphasize the grassroots 
dimension and its post-materialist values superseding consumerism (Gib-
son-Graham, 2008; Grodach, 2013; De Angelis, 2010).
19. Foreign elites were more active since the time of the Bavarians, who reigned and built 
Athens in the 19th century, and the refugee settlement in the interwar period, which was realized 
by the League on Nations (Leontidou, 1990).
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During the recent debt crisis young people, often unemployed or un-
deremployed, tend to form an educated grassroots with online participa-
tion, which produces interactive alternative initiatives, informal activities, 
solidarity endeavors, diverse economies, the ‘commons’, and spontaneous 
social mobilization for the allocation of resources ‘from below’ (as on Ta-
ble 3 in the next section). Their inventiveness should not be considered as 
mere survival: it is gradually acknowledged that several niches of creativ-
ity have emerged in the wasteland of the Eurozone crisis, quite vulnerable 
but also empowered by autonomy, knowledge, and the use of technology. 
Popular e-networking thus becomes a means to open innovation, hence, a 
key factor for social cohesion and social justice in the city (Mitchell, 2003; 
Leontidou, 2006, 2010). By inserting the notion of grassroots creativity as 
a component of Smart City theory, we disentangle the latter from the grip 
of neoliberalism and, in a way, we democratize the debate.
toWardS a typoLoGy of aLternative Creative 
GraSSrootS initiativeS
Transformations towards a Mediterranean grassroots Smart City emerge 
out of creative initiatives, actions, strategies and interactions supported 
by iCt. It is especially interesting that many of these have been emerging 
in the aftermath of major mobilizations. We can therefore speculate, 
that the anti-austerity movement and, indirectly, austerity or the crisis 
itself, seem to create qualitative transformations of the city such as the 
emergence of creative niches, which can potentially overthrow the crisis! 
These are not widespread or massive phenomena, but they are linked to 
networked collectivities which communicate, often globally, via iCt use. 
We can already present a relevant typology based on our empirical study 
of evidence from South European urban experiences through participant 
observation and the Internet. Current research has been discovering 
diverse economies and the ‘commons’, but does not differentiate these on 
the basis of the technological component, which is not universal in the 
above, but is of interest to our approach here. The three spatial scales of 
the following exploratory two-dimensional typology also reflect degrees of 
‘digitalization’ and flow: mainly offline & local; hybrid & national; mainly 
online & international. Its seven parallel axes depict types of creative 
alternative initiatives, as follows:
1. Alternative political mobilizations in public spaces engage people 
outside the traditional political system (Afouxenidis, 2014). During the 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 23:56:04 |
88 LiLa Leontidou
crisis, social rather than political movements predominate,20 which address 
the economic crisis, oppose austerity policies and the democratic deficit, 
and actively undermine the current hegemony of neoliberalism. As several 
citizens are involved in e-networking and Web 2.0 applications rather than 
becoming members of political parties, the diffusion of iCt raises urgent 
antithetical arguments: is political participation decreasing and political 
apathy increasing with the use of iCt and/ or the concentration of power 
via iCt? Or is political participation merely changing, taking new forms 
(Putnam, 2000; Dahlgren, 2009; Afouxenidis, 2012)? We tend to the sec-
ond alternative. In popular assemblies during the ‘movement of the piaz-
zas’ in Spain and Greece in 2011, the grassroots supported the political phi-
losophy of direct democracy rather than representative democracy. They 
have debated ways of interacting, discussing and voting independently 
from political parties. Collectivities, networks of activists and unattached 
citizens in Athens have revived the ancient agora in Syntagma Square; but 
contrary to classical antiquity, women were included, as already pointed 
out (Leontidou, 2012a, 2014). Digital communication among cities of the 
world broadened the spaces of interaction, creating innovations in political 
participation and political utopias, emergent during the Movement of the 
piazzas. They started locally and became international, like the Occupy 
movement, which is now global.
2. Alternative/ diverse economies and ‘commoning’ have been doc-
umented by voluminous bibliography (Gibson-Graham, 2008, 2010; De 
Angelis, 2010; Stavrides, 2014; Gritzas and Kavoulakos, 2015): grassroots 
networks of solidarity initiatives and survival ventures support new defini-
tions of the ‘commons’ and the so-called social and solidarity economy.21 
They promote alternative initiatives of exchange without intermediaries. 
Transactions in kind rather than money, bartering, alternative currencies 
(e.g. the much-discussed bitcoin) and costing units of time play a major 
20. Social movements as defined by Castells (2012) do not aim at power, but at alternative 
societies and cultures.
21. Besides a growing bibliography, the Internet is full of examples: see the film of 2014 
on Greek knowledge ‘commons’ in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iCZgZeym0w&featur
e=youtu.be (accessed in March 2014). There are exchange bazaars, alternative currencies, time 
banks, exchange without intermediaries, markets of food distribution, urban vegetable gardens, 
seed exchange banks, collective kitchens, social groceries, solidarity hospitals and pharmacies 
and education establishments, productive ventures, migrants assistance, antiracist organizations 
and festivals, squats, collective use of cars, vacation exchange networks, and other initiatives 
which fall to our other categories, too, besides 2.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 10/01/2020 23:56:04 |
 «Smart CitieS» of the debt CriSiS 89
role in these solidarity economies (North, 2007; Amin, 2009). Coopera-
tives of organic production and consumption, social groceries, communi-
ty-supported and collective agricultural production are based in peri-urban 
areas and the countryside, but they always affect cities and are mostly 
networked digitally. All these constitute survival efforts, but also creative 
initiatives of ‘commoning’ and alternative institution building, as well as 
innovation. They lead to the creation of a cooperative social/ economic/ 
cultural life, alternative to the dominant one which is recently deformed 
by neoliberalism, austerity and the crisis. Solidarity networks taking up 
welfare services include health care, which is provided in a multitude of 
local bases by Medécins sans Frontières and the Doctors of the World. Co-
operative media, like ert Open since 2013 and the earlier Efimerida ton 
Syntakton in Greece, can be added on to this category.
3. Productive innovation networks can be used as start-up ventures 
in the Smart City as theorized here, with a core of grassroots creativity. 
Software production in independent networks of ‘commoning’ and around 
universities has been mushrooming in Greece, especially after 2008 and 
then after 2011,22 when the athens uprisings brought together young peo-
ple interested in iCt and sharing values about direct democracy and digital 
freedom in a “commons-based restructuring of production”.23 these net-
works support the free circulation of knowledge and work toward the crea-
tion of indigenous innovation in software to upgrade the place of the coun-
try, which is now a periphery consuming innovations produced abroad. 
Indeed they innovate in open software production and its implementation, 
such as 3-D printing,24 communications and networking for the public. 
Another branch of productive innovation is oriented towards open energy 
production for citizens to share in the ‘commons’. Networks of citizens ex-
22. The Digital Liberation Network (dLn) was established in 2008, after the Athens riots, 
and hackerspace.gr appeared in 2011, directly in the aftermath of anti-austerity movements.
23. Title by Vasilis Kostakis to his presentation of P2P Lab in the CommonsFest in Ath-
ens, 17.05.2015; see also the argument by other members of labs, in the 51st minute of the 
film on Greek knowledge ‘commons’ in https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iCZgZeym0w&
feature=youtu.be (accessed in March 2014). They call themselves ‘children of 2008’ and ex-
pand on their activities in producing software in networks of ‘commoning’. See https://dln.
gr (accessed in September 2014). Among important production networks we can also mention 
Hum[Erus],http://humerusrobot.wordpress.com, to labaki hackerspace, http://wiki.tolabaki.gr 
(all accessed in September 2014) and others in the above film.
24. P2P lab, Ioannina, http://p2plab.gr (accessed in September 2014) have developed open 
technologies of 3-D printing of objects for the blind. Talin university rather than Greek ones 
was interested in their work.
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periment on technological self-sufficiency and sustainable development.25 
Productive innovation networks are basically isolated from ‘the markets’: 
they produce use values for sharing, and their members do not usually earn 
their living through them. They criticize finance capitalism. The option of 
linking up with alternative economies is still open and full of suggestions.
4. Networks of intervention in local development and the ‘right to the 
city’ are the most numerous and well-documented throughout Southern 
europe.26 Collectivities have long ago opposed urban renewal and mega-
events, have occupied and enlivened urban public spaces and have formed 
or inspired neighbourhood development groups since a very long time.27 
The ‘right to the city’ today retains its emphasis on struggles for housing 
and against evictions, is often assisted by iCt, and emphasizes the urban 
‘commons’ (De Angelis, 2010; Stavrides, 2014). Counter-eviction mobili-
zations predominate in Spain and Italy, whereas in Greece there are mobi-
lizations for reclaiming public space as common space. Such mobilizations 
are most impressive in Turkey (Lovering and Türkmen, 2011), with the 
2013 mobilization for Gezi Park as the top example (Oktem Unsal, 2015). 
Hundreds of occupations of vacant plots and empty property, squats, so-
cial centres, and other means of reconquering urban spaces28 may turn into 
incubators of innovation – though activists are systematically undermined 
and assaulted by dominant classes as ‘delinquents’, or even ‘terrorists’.
25. Networks for open energy production include the project Aktina including Energize, 
City Index Lab (http://www.cityindexlab.com, accessed in September 2014), on technological 
self-sufficiency there is spithari waking life (http://www.spithari.org, accessed in September 
2014); for an inclusive presentation of several productive innovation networks see the above 
film (Footnotes 21, 23).
26. Evidence abounds - all of the following were retrieved in mid-March 2013. Rome: http://
baruda.net/tag/blocchi-precari-metropolitani and http://www.radiondadurto.org/2013/01/19/di-
ritto-alla-casa-riprendiamo - Florence: http://lottaperlacasafirenze.noblogs.org - Madrid: http://
eurovegasno.blogspot.gr and http://afectadosporlahipotecamadrid.net - Barcelona: http://de-
fensemportvell.wordpress.com - Lisbon: - http://plataformagueto.wordpress.com/2012/01/13/
plataforma-gueto and http://www.portaldahabitacao.pt/pt/ibc/lagarteiro/aconteceu_ibc_lagart 
and http://www.habita.info.
27. See Lefebvre, 1968; Leontidou, 1990, 2010; Mitchell, 2003; Horta, 2004; Harvey, 2012. 
besides europe and the uSa, in Mediterranean and Latin American squatter settlements social 
movements have innovated as ‘critical urban planning’ agents (Souza 2006).
28. Mayer, 2009; Leontidou, 2010, 2012; Brenner et al., 2012; Harvey, 2012. It is worth 
referring here to the Snea Viscosa social centre, a major occupation on the outskirts of Rome, 
which supports alternative activities and ‘commoning’ and also provides shelter to people. To-
ward the same suburban location there are also squatter buildings, such as those in Corviale.
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5. Linked with the above and addressing the cultural dimension of the 
‘right to the city’, it is worth investigating alternative cultural empower-
ment.29 Artistic political creativity has been popularized by the Internet as 
innovative graphic design, blogs, You Tube uploads and images (Castells, 
2012, p. 107). Moreover, the staging of open-air cultural events, festivals, 
popular museums and libraries, alternative exhibitions, performative arts, 
music, graffiti, recreation initiatives, innovative and radical art strategies in-
volve the grassroots in more demanding creative forms (Klanten and Hüb-
ner, 2010; Millington, 2011; Tsilimpounidi, 2012). Mainstream bibliogra-
phy has addressed the role of artists in the Creative City during the process 
of gentrification (Zukin, 1982, cf critique by Morgan and Ren, 2012; Gor-
nostaeva and Campbell, 2012), but here we have no ‘gentry’. We have situ-
ationist approaches to art (Barnard, 2004) in reconquered niches of the city, 
and re-used derelict industrial spaces, where alternative cultural empower-
ment emerges, often in hybrid forms of material and virtual spaces. Innova-
tive interventions and experimentation in the city involve diverse innova-
tions, as well as the reinterpretation of tradition, in ways that the pioneers of 
performative arts used to do (Konomis, 2015). These are not always exactly 
public art, but most frequently rather belong to the ‘commons’.
6. Diasporic initiatives involve digital exchange and interaction with 
the ‘homeland’ by South Europeans settled in cities around the globe. 
Those departing from Greece, in mounting numbers, inevitably leave a 
brain drain behind (Lambrianides and Vogiatzis, 2013). As if offering an 
antidote to this loss, the Diasporic communities become active in the virtu-
al common space in solidarity to the ‘homeland’. Satellite tv keeps them 
informed and they sustain their links with the place of origin more than 
ever in the period of globalization and the crisis. Solidarity activities of 
these communities are now coming centre stage with methods of virtual 
mobilization via Web 2.0 applications and e-networking, such as the col-
lection of signatures to stop the assault of privatization and to promote 
various humanitarian causes, as well as material mobilizations, such as 
marches and picketing initiatives or fundraising. Inversely, the involve-
29. As evidence, all of the following were retrieved in mid-March 2013. Milano: http://
www.temporiuso.org - Palermo: http://www.palermoreport.it/cultura-a-palermo/i-cantieri-che-
vogliamo - Florence: - Madrid: http://www.traficantes.net. During the same period in Greece 
there were: http://atenistas.org/ - http://blog.orizontasgegonoton.gr - http://synallois.org/ - 
http://oikodiktyo.espivblogs.net/ - http://www.proskalo.net (includes an open university) and 
other cultural, ecological and educational collectivities.
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TABLE 3




Mainly offline and Lo-
cal (and Urban)
Hybrid and Trans-local, 
National









Popular assemblies in 
urban piazzas of Greece 
– Syntagma of Athens, 
central piazzas of provin-
cial towns
Movement of the piaz-
zas, interaction between 
athens and madrid by 








ceries,31 open markets,32 
collective kitchens, 




exchange of goods with-
out intermediaries (Peliti 
seeds, ‘potato move-
ment’)







ficiency and sustainable 
development innova-
tions, e.g. Spithari
Production of software, 
3-D printing, robotics, 
or open energy by ‘com-
moning’ networks,33 e.g. 
DLN, P2P lab hacker-
space.gr
Production of soft-
ware by international 
networks, e.g. Fablab 
around 85 University 
labs34
4. The ‘right to 
the city’
Defense of public 
spaces, Exarcheia, oc-
cupation of Navarino 
Park in Athens, former 
airport in Elliniko.35
Occupations of several 
Greek town piazzas si-
multaneously, collectivi-
ties such as Imagine the 
City.
European network of 
urban movements (Al-
ter-globalization fora in 
Athens 2006 and other 





Street Theatre, Street 
art scene: Athens 
Plaython,36 arbitCity 
Group, Bleeps.gr, Ath-
ens Culture Networks, 
open-air events
Athens Art Network,37 
Frown- performance, Art 
Resistance, Art Bank, 
Rock and hip hop groups 
including Killah P.38
Blogs, uploads of art 
and music, events in 
Athens piazzas by Thèa-
tre du Soleil (from Par-
is); Tiger Lillies (from 
London); international 








Source: Compiled by the author from participant observation and Internet sites mentioned 
above in the footnotes, with additional examples given by the colleagues in the first 
footnote of this article.
30. We can find them mapped on the Internet by area, e.g. for the central Athens self-managed 
social spaces and squats the map is on http://www.enallaktikos.gr/kg15el_antallaktika-diktya_t65_
k9186.html (accessed in February 2014).
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ment of diasporas in homeland politics can be conservative. And their in-
formation can be controlled, as it was during the summer of 2013, when 
the Greek government shut down ert and their satellite tv went black.
7. Global e-networks’ legacy was created during alter-globalization 
movements, when the cities of the world were filled by flâneur activists 
connected via iCt and regularly assembling in various cities of the world 
(Leontidou 2006). Such international or global or cosmopolitan collectivi-
ties with an impact from the local up to the global scale include diasporic 
ones, environmental, human rights and alter-globalization networks con-
cerned with global but also local sustainable development, social justice 
and the environment, and major nGos exemplified by Greenpeace, Avaaz, 
Medécins sans Frontiers, and many other global collectivities. Since most 
of these are actually nGos rather than spontaneous movements, however, 
as are most of the global networks we can refer to here, including them 
would mean that we change the subject (Souza, 2013; Leontidou, 2015).
The above axes of creativity must be urgently considered as alternative 
initiatives or development strategies worth incorporating into the logic of 
the Smart City. Some are particular to the South, while others embrace 
several regions. They do not appear with the same frequency, intensity, 
content and form across Mediterranean spaces and localities. It is fascinat-
31. Evidence abounds for Greece, including 3175 exchange and solidarity networks by locality 
and region, which can be found in http://www.enallaktikos.gr/kg15el_diktya-allileggyis.html (ac-
cessed in February 2014).
32. E.g. open market without intermediaries at the Piraeus port, 2014.
33. See footnotes 20-22 above and the inclusive filmhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iCZ
gZeym0w&feature=youtu.be (accessed in March 2014).
34. Fablab (Fablabathens.gr, accessed in September 2014) is based in the National Technical 
university (emp) as part of a network of 85 labs around the world coordinated by mit to develop 
digital production in microfactories, networks, homes.
35. For self-managed agricultural fields in Elliniko and proposals for a metropolitan park in the 
area, see http://parkoellinikou.blogspot.gr (accessed in March 2013). Occupations in other towns 
include the occupied Viome factory in Thessaloniki, the Castle & barracks as common space in 
Keratea, etc.
36. See http://athensplaython.org (accessed in September 2014).
37. See www.athensartnetwork.gr (accessed in September 2014) for a nation-wide and interna-
tionally connected initiative since 2012, which has been established in 2012 to organize and encoura-
ge alternative cultural institutions like Garden Festival, Little Paris, Mediterepolis, etc.
38. The hip hop musician Pavlos Fyssas, murdered by Chrysi Avgi party thugs. For Frown-
performance see www.frowntails.com (accessed in September 2014).
39. Greenpeace (http://www.greenpeace.org/), Avaaz (http://www.avaaz.org/), Medécins sans 
Frontiers (http://www.msf.org/) (accessed in February 2014).
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ing to understand and interpret the unequal development of creativity, not 
only in different urban and regional settings, where it is embedded, but 
also in different international, Diaspora and global communities. A series 
of typologies can be created, similar with the following one, illustrated 
with examples from Greece:
The initiatives shown on the above tentative table are networked each 
one for itself, but, among them, they are rather fragmented and dispersed. 
The CommonsFest, organized yearly first in Heracleio and now in Athens 
(15-17.05.2015), has opened up the interaction among some of the ini-
tiatives on Axis 2 and 3; but we can reflect on the strength of change in 
socioeconomic regimes if such initiatives came to collaborate. Brand new 
combinations would give the Smart City a totally new meaning! The table 
also opens broader theoretical questions of local/ global interplay and the 
continuum between virtuality and materiality in cultural, economic and 
political intervention. Another challenging aspect of the typology is the 
possibility of further subdivision on the basis of the innovative dimen-
sion of virtual/ material / hybrid spaces and intermediate trans-local spatial 
scales. But this would require further research, more empirical cases, and 
a more advanced platform. The above table is a first attempt to systematize 
initiatives in the context of hybridity and the harmonization of diverse 
spaces under way in Smart Cities of the crisis.
SuppreSSion or inCubation?
It has been argued in this paper that the components, and mainly the 
actors, of urban initiatives, are changing during the debt crisis, especially 
in the Mediterranean. The parallel movement of the crisis – accompanied 
by unemployment and the brain drain – and iCt dissemination and 
penetration, creates contradictions but also gives rise to initiatives which 
highlight popular spontaneity at its best. People who are e-networked, 
educated and inventive venture to change their everyday lives and local 
economies by associating in common and diverse collectivities without 
leaders or hierarchies and by opening up digitally to global networks and 
cosmopolitan cultures. In an ever more complex and indeed hybrid public 
realm, a space of flows (Castells, 2012), people at long distances interact 
frequently: activists, collectivities, popular assemblies, and cities of Spain, 
Greece, Turkey, Egypt and beyond interact in virtual sectors and spaces. 
Cities open up to the twofold ensemble of virtual and material, a fusion 
which leads to urban transformation.
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The introduction of the digitally literate grassroots enhances creativity 
to combat the debt crisis and tends toward strengthening Mediterranean 
‘weak’ civil societies (Leontidou, 2010, 2015). This creativity has inspired 
us to include the grassroots into the Smart City concept. The examples 
given above and other such alternative initiatives are still fragmented and 
spontaneous, in Gramsci’s (1971, p. 196) sense; but they are on the rise.
The power elites keep suppressing them, continuing a long history of 
recuperation or cooptation of discourses, suppression of uprisings for the 
‘right to the city’ in material public spaces and piazzas, often by violent 
means. Sometimes this does not even keep up appearances. In Greece co-
ercion (rather than hegemony) has been exercised to subsume grassroots 
alternative initiatives into the dominant cultures and values (Leontidou, 
1990, 2010). There has been unprecedented police brutality since 2008, 
during the ‘clearance’ of Syntagma in July 2011, extended till 2013. Early 
that year, squats and social centres were attacked and evacuated and their 
inhabitants were even branded ‘terrorists’. In late 2013 the attack against 
ert journalists signalled unscrupulous censorship and attempts to control 
virtual spaces. In this way popular creativity is constantly stifled in a cruel, 
insensitive and autocratic environment. Austerity policy has been imple-
mented with the use of force – assaults, cooptation, recuperation, state 
and eu coercion, quasi-Orientalism and constant stigmatization by power 
elites. This type of neoliberal top-down ‘policy’ has been largely responsi-
ble for unemployment, unregulated migration and the brain drain, as well 
as urbicide; it has been undermining the decent survival and the dignity 
of the popular strata, let alone grassroots creativity. In the early 2010s of-
fensives became too loud.
In such a climate, constructive grassroots alternative initiatives may 
be transformed to destructive ones. Inversely and ironically, however, this 
climate has indirectly boosted creativity in Greece, and eventually gave 
birth to constructive strategies counteracting assaults, suppression, recu-
peration, and the resulting urban blight. In other words, austerity indirectly 
gave rise to popular creativity in the aftermath of anti-austerity move-
ments. Initiatives like those shown on Table 3 are all very recent: they have 
followed oscillations of popular mobilization, and can be now considered 
as alternative strategies of urban revival in a digital society.
Social movements require resilience in order to end up in such alterna-
tive initiatives, and their aftermath of creative action has to be supported, if 
development is sought. How can vulnerable emergent innovative actions, 
and collectivities creating them, be protected from top-down coercion, and 
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assisted to overcome their fragmentation and enhance their positive role in 
social cohesion and innovation, hence, development? One line of protec-
tion comes from cosmopolitan solidarity brought about by social networks: 
the local level expands to the trans-local by iCt and Web 2.0, obtaining 
strength and effectiveness by attracting attention and support by other col-
lectivities and interacting with them. Solidarity networks then counteract 
violence, desperation, immiseration, and also emigration. Another line of 
protection comes from the democratization of knowledge, partly with dis-
semination and partly with research, which will seek, evaluate, compare 
and contrast diverse constructive strategies of solidarity, alternative net-
works of initiative and creativity.
Networks of solidarity and knowledge are invaluable, but they are not 
enough. Vulnerability is actually caused by top-down policy, national and 
eu. At best, policy stresses ‘shopfront’ works to regenerate cities, instead 
of embeddedness and synergies necessary for the protection and intercon-
nection of creative niches (Leontidou, 2015). At worst, top-down policy 
has been exhausted in coercion to enforce the austerity memoranda of the 
2010s. It is being increasingly realized by affected people, that austerity is 
actually a strategy for cheap labour reproduction rather than a necessity. 
Assaults tend to obliterate alternative initiatives at the very period when 
cities need them most, in order to recover from the crisis. Wide e-net-
working at the international scale opens up options at the grassroots level, 
but this must expand and become a central objective of top-down policy, 
too. EU elites and bureaucrats must now abandon the quasi-Orientalist dis-
courses, must revise their objectives and strategies for domination, and 
must reconsider hegemony rather than coercion (Gramsci, 1971). Insist-
ence on austerity will multiply dystopias and reproduce poverty and the 
crisis in general. 
The only emergent hope of the dispossessed South is its youth, even if 
many of them finally opt for emigration. Policy makers have yet to engage 
with the youth of Europe toward Smart Cities, rather than branding them as 
delinquents in the quasi-Orientalist discourse of the North. Positive policy 
would certainly counteract the ‘brain drain’, from which the South is suf-
fering during the crisis. The very people who, having spent a long period in 
higher education, are prone to migrate abroad after roaming in unemploy-
ment or becoming destructive, could be turned into valuable human capital 
to spark a developing knowledge economy, if properly supported.
The viability of development during the crisis, hopefully within Medi-
terranean Smart Cities, largely depends on the resilience and/ or sustain-
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ability of grassroots movements and alternative initiatives. Phrased more 
formally, it is one step ahead to propose the theoretical modification of the 
Smart City, disentangling it from neoliberalism and connecting it with the 
creative grassroots. One step further establishes the Smart City as a proac-
tive and nomotheric concept. In this, our proposal is to pursue its revival 
during the crisis in connection with the grassroots, in the context of ad-
vocacy planning. This would be a utopian reflection before January 2015, 
when the Left came to power in Greece. Now, however, policy supporting 
the knowledge base of cities, their youth and its grassroots initiatives with 
their technological sophistication, figures as quite feasible, though there is 
still the inertia of memoranda, but also of bureaucracies stifling the devel-
opment of innovative action. 
Formalizing further, if creativity is sought in the city, then the incubator 
hypothesis (Davelaar and Nijcamp, 1988) must be mobilized for the em-
powerment and the interconnection of more vulnerable popular alternative 
initiatives. This is yet another concept based on neoliberal assumptions, 
which, after being put to doubt in the past by institutional economics, can 
be turned around now, for the protection of creative niches in Mediterra-
nean cities. It is worthwhile, or even essential, to practice advocacy plan-
ning in order to safeguard and support them in an area which suffers from 
fragmentation, impoverishment, dispossession, but also demoralization 
and a propensity to destroy.
Conservative governments and eu elites adopt neoliberalism, insist in 
austerity, and try to impose it through offensives, counteracting grassroots 
creativity and joie de vivre (Leontidou, 2014). Such policies do not solve 
any problems at all: social cohesion is wounded, niches of creativity are 
destroyed, civil societies are severed, aggressiveness and urbicide are pro-
voked, bringing down the alternative creativity options in their way, and 
destroying prospects for the Smart City. Top-down offensives do not only 
destroy labourers, collectivities, or ‘uncompetitive’ localities, as the power 
elites think; they also destroy cities, regions, and the whole cause of Euro-
pean integration more widely. In this connection, other policy agents and 
collectivities must be discovered, who can in time advocate and support the 
grassroots Smart City and creative initiatives towards development, smart 
growth, participatory democracy and emancipatory politics more widely. 
The present paper hopes to constitute a stepping stone in that direction.
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